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Vagueness and Fuzzy Logic
by Darren Hibbs
Some terms are vague. A vague term is one that foils our attempts to establish whether it
applies in some cases. Consider the term “bald.” There are cases where it is clear that a person is
bald and cases where it is clear that a person is not bald. But there are some cases where it is not
clear whether the individual in question qualifies as “bald.” Many of the terms we use in
ordinary situations have this feature. Terms such as “city,” “tall,” “middle aged,” and “rich,”
admit borderline cases where it is not clear that the term applies or fails to apply. Moreover,
uncertainty about the applicability of a vague term does not seem to be a result of ignorance on
the part of the language user. For example, one may know the exact number of hairs on a head or
the exact number of people who live in a community, yet still be unsure about whether the head
is bald or whether the population constitutes a city.
Vagueness poses a number of philosophical problems. For example, vagueness appears to
threaten a basic principle of classical logic known as “bivalence.” Bivalence is a theory about
propositions. Propositions are meaningful assertions that something is the case. According to the
principle of bivalence, every proposition is either true or false, but not both. The intuition
supporting bivalence is straightforward—an assertion that some state of affairs obtains is either
accurate or inaccurate. But consider the proposition “That person is bald.” If the principle of
bivalence is true, the proposition must be either “true” or “false.” But if the person in question is
a borderline case of baldness, the proposition “That person is bald” resists classification as either
“true” or “false.” Examples of this sort lead some critics of classical logic to reject bivalence in
favor of alternative methods of characterizing the truth-values of propositions.1
The problem of vagueness is also instrumental in the construction of logical paradoxes. A
logical paradox is an apparently sound argument that contains an apparently absurd or false
conclusion. Paradoxes generate problems in logic because sound arguments are not supposed to
entail absurd or false conclusions. A classic exposition of a vagueness-related paradox is
attributed to Eubulides, a 4th-century philosopher from Miletus, who formulated the following
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paradox based upon the vagueness of the term “heap.”2 The version presented here is just one of
many ways to characterize the paradox. Suppose there is a heap of 100,000 kernels of corn. If
one kernel is removed from the heap, does the heap of corn still exist? The intuitive answer is
“yes.” If another kernel is removed, does the heap of corn still exist? Again, the intuitive answer
is “yes.” If 100,000 kernels is a heap of corn, then 99,998 kernels is also a heap of corn. Suppose
that this process continues with one kernel at a time being removed until all the kernels are gone
and the heap has vanished. The question is: at what point does the heap no longer exist? There
are only two possible answers:
(1) There is no point that marks the demise of the heap.
(2) There is a point that marks the demise of the heap.
Option (1) entails that the heap never disappears. But this is false, since at the final stage of the
process, there are no kernels left to compose a heap. According to option (2), the existence of a
heap must depend upon the presence or absence of one kernel of corn. But this is absurd. A
single kernel of corn is not a heap-making entity. The situation presents a paradox because a
simple chain of reasoning (if “x” is removed, “y” is still a heap, etc.) leads to two possible
conclusions that are robustly implausible. Vagueness is present in the case because a heap is
another term that admits borderline cases. It is simply unclear whether a heap is present in some
circumstances, even if one knows the number of components involved (kernels, in this case).
This sort of paradox can be mapped onto other cases where the numerical identity (or
sameness) of unique objects over time is susceptible to vagueness. Numerical identity is
distinguished from qualitative identity. Objects “x” and “y” bear a relation of qualitative identity
when both objects possess the same qualities. For example, imagine two billiard balls that are
both composed of the same type of material and possess the same dimensions, weight, and color.
The billiard balls are qualitatively the same since they possess the same qualitative features. But
they are not numerically identical because there are two billiard balls rather than one. That is,
one ball could be destroyed while the other continues to exist. Numerical identity would be the
target if one were to ask whether one of the billiard balls was the “same” ball that was used in a
game a week earlier. This question is not about whether one of the balls possesses the same
qualitative features as the one used earlier. This question is about whether one of the two balls is
the one that was used a week earlier. We attribute numerical identity to many things on a regular
basis. The people one knows, the car one drives, one's dwelling, a familiar tree seen on the way
to work, etc. are all considered numerically the same over time, despite the qualitative changes
that these kinds of entities undergo over time. But the numerical identity of objects over time
may be obscured in cases where vagueness is present.
Let's consider a scenario involving the gradual disassembly of the original sculpture, Venus
de Milo. Suppose that a small particle the size of a grain of sand was removed from the
sculpture. Let us call this altered version of the sculpture Venus*. Is Venus* numerically the
same as the original Venus? As in the case of the heap, the removal of one particle of that size
would not, intuitively, amount to the destruction of the original statue. Although there is a trivial
qualitative change, it is surely the case that Venus* is numerically the same as the original
Venus. We may continue the process of disassembly by removing another minute particle
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resulting in Venus**. If Venus* is numerically identical to the original Venus, then surely
Venus** is identical to Venus*, since Venus** is the result of the same identity-preserving
procedure that brought about Venus*. Following the example of the heap, the process of
disassembly may proceed in a piecemeal fashion until there are no particles of the original Venus
remaining. At each stage of the disassembly, the relevant question will be “Is the original Venus
still existing?” Thus, we are facing a familiar choice:
(1) The original Venus exists throughout the process of disassembly.
(2) There is a point in the process where the removal of one particle entails that the original
Venus no longer exists.
Option (1) is flatly wrong, since it commits one to the view that the original Venus is identical to
nothing. Option (2) commits one to the view that the continued existence of the statue is decided
on the basis of the presence, or absence, of one minute particle. Thus, option (2) is intuitively
absurd. Vagueness plays a role in this case in the sense that there are stages in the process of
disassembly where it is not clear whether the statue is the same as the original.
The puzzles generated by vagueness raise fundamental questions about the nature of
propositions and the soundness of classical logic. As noted above, some critics of classical logic
respond to the problem of vagueness by rejecting the principle of bivalence in favor of
alternative accounts of assigning truth-values to propositions. Again, according to the principle
of bivalence every meaningful proposition must be either true or false, but not both. Nonpropositional linguistic expressions do not possess a truth-value. For example, questions,
exclamations, and gibberish are neither true nor false since they do not assert that something is or
isn't the case. But a proposition possesses one, and only one, truth-value regardless of whether
we know (or are capable of knowing) its truth-value. For example, the proposition “God exists”
is either true or false, regardless of whether anyone knows (or could know) that the proposition is
true or false. If bivalence is true, the proposition “That person is bald” must also be true or false
since it is a declaration that something is the case. But this is problematic. In some cases, one can
know all the relevant information (the number of hairs, their arrangement, etc.) yet still be unsure
about whether the assertion is true or false. Thus, the problem does not appear to be the result of
epistemic limitations.3 It may be the case that propositions employing vague terms simply defy
the bivalent categorization of classical logic.
One response to this problem is to reject bivalence and propose an alternative account of
truth-value assignments to propositions. For example, one may argue that some propositions do
not have a truth-value or that there may be more than two truth-values for propositions. The
latter strategy utilizes a many-valued or polyvalent method of assigning truth values to
propositions. One form of polyvalence is employed by proponents of “fuzzy logic.”4 Fuzzy logic
posits a range of possible truth-values for propositions. The range of possible truth values can be
represented numerically. For example, a proposition that is completely false is assigned a value
of (0) and a proposition that is completely true is assigned a value of (1). But some propositions
are neither completely true nor completely false, so their truth-value assignment would be a
number between (0) and (1). The numerical truth-value can be fine-tuned to any decimal place.
Consider the proposition “That person is bald.” If the person's head is completely hairless, the
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proposition is assigned a value of (1) since the statement is completely true. If the person's head
is densely covered with hair, the proposition is assigned a value of (0) since the claim is
completely false. But if the head in question is a borderline case, the truth-value of the
proposition might be something like (.432). The assignment of (.432) indicates that the
proposition is sort of true but mostly false. But in other cases the proposition might receive a
value of (.745), which indicates that the proposition is mostly true and slightly false.
Proponents of fuzzy logic argue that a polyvalent method of assigning truth-values offers a
more precise classification of propositions infected by vagueness when compared to the bivalent
method.5 The application of the fuzzy method to the paradox of the heap and the case of the
statue is straightforward. Consider the following propositions:
(a) The heap of corn is still present.
(b) The Venus de Milo is still present.
According to the fuzzy logic approach, it is not necessary to view each of these propositions
as perfectly true or false. Each proposition might be more or less true, given the circumstances.
For example, about half way through the process of disassembling the statue, the truth-value of
(b) would reflect the degree of departure from perfect truth to some value that is (>0) but (<1).
Thus, instead of being unable to assign a truth value at all (which is the problem for the advocate
of bivalence), the fuzzy logician is in a position to capture the gradual erosion of truth at each
stage in the process of disassembly.
The fuzzy logic approach to the problem cases above is intuitively attractive, but closer
scrutiny of the fuzzy method reveals serious difficulties that merit our attention.6 I will briefly
explain two of these difficulties. The first problem is about the failure of a polyvalent approach
to addressing the issue of vagueness. The second problem is related to the concept of truth.
The motivation for adopting a many-valued approach in cases of vagueness is to avoid the
embarrassing quandary associated with bivalence in borderline cases. But the many-valued
approach fails to avoid the problem of vagueness in borderline cases in the same manner as the
bivalent approach. For example, if the fuzzy logician assigns a truth-value of (.432) to the
proposition “That person is bald”, a reasonable question would be to ask how the (.432) state of
baldness is distinguished from the (.433) or the (.431) state of baldness. Given an appropriately
middling state of baldness, there doesn't seem to be a non-arbitrary way of choosing one of these
truth-values over the other. That is, there doesn't seem to be a fact about the state of baldness that
signals the correctness of one value but not the others. But this is the same problem that
confronts the proponent of bivalence in borderline cases. The vagueness that attends borderline
cases of “bald” and “not bald” is simply relocated to the border of the finer distinction between
(.432) and (.433) degrees of baldness. Since borderline cases apply within the fuzzy system also,
the polyvalent method of assigning truth-values is susceptible to the same puzzles and paradoxes
that confront the bivalent method.
The proponent of fuzzy logic may respond to this objection by pointing out that it is perhaps
less worrying to be unsure about the difference between (.432) and (.433) baldness than it is to
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be unsure about the distinction between “bald” and “not-bald.” That is, fuzzy logic provides us
with a more precise measurement of baldness even though vagueness has not been eliminated
from the picture. But this result can be achieved without dispensing with bivalence. We may
simply stipulate very precise conditions for baldness, heaps, etc. so that we will be able to assign
truth-values for propositions in some of the formerly troublesome cases. We do not bother with
this in ordinary linguistic practice. Why? We do not need very precise definitions for baldness or
heaps in everyday discourse. Our ability to communicate effectively simply does not require
rigorous conceptual precision in most circumstances. Furthermore, vagueness is desirable for
some communicative purposes. If I suggest that some proposed activity be postponed until
“later,” a person on the lookout for vagueness might note that it is difficult to pinpoint what I
mean by “later.” But this might be due to the fact that I do not know exactly what I mean by
“later.” I only know that the activity is not desirable now, but presumably will be desirable at
some unknown point in the future. Thus, vagueness is sometimes an essential component of
communication.
A second problem involves the concept of truth itself. The concept of truth as is it is
employed in formal logical systems is distinct from the concept of truth in the metaphysical
sense. The former concept of truth is merely a function of the rules or axioms of a logical system.
The rules of a logical system do not tell us whether a given proposition is actually true or false,
or what it means to assert that a proposition is true or false in general. For example, classical
logic defines a conjunction (“P and Q”) as “true” if and only if “P” and “Q” are true individually.
This rule is not about the actual truth-value of “P” or “Q” nor does the rule supply a theory about
what it means for “P” or “Q” to be true individually. Thus, formal logical systems are only
interested in truth to the extent that pre-assigned truth-values are preserved or altered in certain
procedures. But an understanding of the formal role of truth within a logical system does not
address the metaphysical question of truth. What is meant when we assert that a proposition is
true? There are several competing accounts of truth that are designed to answer this question.
These theories are, in part, guided by our use of the term “true” in natural languages. For
example, to assert that some proposition “P” is true may mean that the content of “P” accurately
represents some relevant portion of reality, or that it is useful to believe that “P” is the case, or
that “P” coheres with a set of mutually supporting beliefs.7 The nature of these disagreements is
not the issue in the present context. The current issue is about the desired relationship between
the notion of truth in the logical and metaphysical senses.
It is natural to assume that the concept of truth employed in a formal logical system would
dovetail (in some relevant way) with a metaphysical account of truth that is grounded in ordinary
usage. That is, our formal notion of truth ought to represent at least some aspects of our informal
notion of truth. But when we consider the fuzzy notion of truth, it is not clear what is meant
when one asserts that a proposition possesses a truth-value of (.432)—i.e. that it is “partially
true.” Although we often employ the notion of “partial truth” to evaluate theories, testimony,
etc., when pressed about what we mean by “partially true” those general assessments can be
analyzed into component propositions that are individually true and false in accordance with
bivalence. For example, we may analyze the testimony of a witness in a criminal trial as being
only partially true in the sense that the witness issued some statements that are true and some
statements that are false. Individual statements themselves may be subject to a similar analysis.
But the notion of partial truth is basic to fuzzy logic. If all propositions with a truth-value ranging
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from (>0) to (<1) could be analyzed into components that are either (1) or (0), then bivalence has
not been eliminated. Thus, some propositions just are (.432) true irreducibly. But it is difficult to
grasp what this could mean without analyzing the proposition into component parts that are
either true or false.
However, the fuzzy logician might respond by arguing that this complaint is not to the point.
Logical systems are idealized languages that need not conform to the informal customs of
ordinary language users. In particular, symmetry with natural languages is not a necessary
condition for developing a satisfactory formal account of propositional truth-values. A proponent
of fuzzy logic may acknowledge that in ordinary language we analyze partial truths into
component propositions that are either true or false, yet argue that this is irrelevant since formal
logic is not concerned with ordinary language. Thus, the notion of irreducible partial truths
should not count as evidence against the adequacy of the polyvalent approach. But this maneuver
generates a dilemma for the fuzzy logician. If formal logic is an idealized language that is not
beholden to ordinary language, then the initial motive for renouncing bivalence is no longer
operative (i.e. cases involving the application of vague terms). That is, bivalence works perfectly
well in classical logic if the only propositions employed are those that are either true or false.
Trouble arises only in cases where a bivalent logical apparatus is applied to real world cases
where at least one proposition cannot be assigned a truth-value. Alternatively, if the fuzzy
logician argues that the polyvalent approach captures ordinary language more precisely than
bivalence, we may point to fuzzy logic’s failure to eliminate vagueness and its adherence to the
dubious concept of irreducible partial truth that lies outside of ordinary language. Thus,
regardless of whether fuzzy logic is regarded as an idealized language or as a formal adjunct to
ordinary language, there is no reason to favor polyvalence over bivalence.
Of course, these considerations do not show that fuzzy logic endorses false claims or that it
is an incoherent theory. Nor do these considerations show that there are no problems with
bivalence. The adoption of a logical system involves trade-offs. As noted above, vagueness is an
essential aspect of ordinary language. But the vagueness of ordinary language appears to be
incommensurable with the desired precision of a formal language in logic. So what does this
mean with respect to the relationship between the formal language of a logical system and
ordinary language? For classical logic, it means that the “sweet simplicity”8 of bivalence is
cherished at the expense of facing the bitter reality of vagueness. But the cost of replacing
bivalence with fuzzy logic is greater since the problem of vagueness is retained and a suspicious
concept of truth is added to the bill. Given these considerations, the case for revoking bivalence
in favor of fuzzy logic is not persuasive.
Endnotes

1. The term “classical logic” refers to the logical systems developed by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand
Russell, and others during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Bivalence was also accepted by
many ancient and medieval logicians. For a general account of alternative logical systems that
reject bivalence, see An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is, by Graham Priest
(Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic, by Susan Haack
(University of Chicago Press, 1996).
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2. For logical paradoxes in general, see A Brief History of the Paradox, by Roy Sorensen
(Oxford University Press, 2003). For the “heap” version of the sorites paradox, see Vagueness: A
Reader, edited by Rosanna Keefe and Peter Smith (MIT Press, 1999), especially chapters 2, 7,
10, 12, and 15.
3. Some philosophers argue that vagueness is a result of epistemic failure. See Vagueness and
Contradiction, by Roy Sorensen (Oxford University Press, 2001); and Vagueness, by Timothy
Williamson (Routledge, 1994).
4. See Priest and Haack, note 1, for general accounts of fuzzy logic.
5. See Vagueness and Degrees of Truth, by Nicholas J. J. Smith (Oxford University Press, 2009),
chapter 5.
6. For a thorough critical analysis of the formal aspects of fuzzy logic, see “Vagueness in
Reality”, by Timothy Williamson in The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, edited by Michael
Loux and Dean Zimmerman (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 690-715.
7. There are still other options. For detailed accounts of standard theories of truth, see Truth,
edited by Simon Blackburn and Keith Simmons (Oxford University Press, 1999).
8. “What Price Bivalence?” by Willard van Orman Quine, in Journal of Philosophy 78 (2), pp.
90-5, p. 91.
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